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PAY CONFIDENTIALITY: A REMAINING OBSTACLE TO
EQUAL PAY AFTER LEDBETTER
Brian P. O’Neill
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

In April 2007, Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion in
1
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company —the most controversial
labor-and-employment case of the 2006–2007 term for the Supreme
2
Court of the United States. Ledbetter called on the Court to decide
whether a plaintiff may proceed with a pay-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) when an employer’s decision to discriminate occurred outside of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging period, but the
employer issued paychecks reflecting the unlawful discrimination
3
within the EEOC charging period. The Court, in a five-to-four opinion, held that individual paychecks do not qualify as discrete acts of
discrimination and that an employee, for his or her filing to be timely, must file a complaint within 180 or 300 days, depending on
4
whether the employee filed with a state or local agency, of the em5
ployer’s discriminatory pay decisions. Ledbetter garnered widespread
6
7
8
criticism from academics, politicians, and civic organizations.
∗
J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Villanova University. I would like to thank Professor Sullivan for his input and guidance throughout
the entire process of writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Mom and Dad
for all of their love and support.
1
550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
2
Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s 2006−2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A
Quiet But Revealing Term, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 219, 219–20 (2007).
3
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623.
4
An aggrieved person must file a claim within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). But if she has filed a claim with a state or local
agency, the aggrieved person must file the claim within the earlier of either 300 days
of the unlawful conduct or 30 days after the state or local agency terminated proceedings. Id.
5
See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628.
6
See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court: 2006 Term: Constitutions and
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 81 (2007) (“What
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These critics argued that the decision would foreclose many victims
9
of pay discrimination from the opportunity to file a timely claim.
Members of the 110th Congress promptly countered the Court’s
decision with legislation designed to overturn Ledbetter, but oppo10
nents of the bill successfully forestalled the measure in the Senate.
After the 2008 election, however, Congress and President Barack Obama answered Ledbetter’s critics’ ongoing concerns with the Lilly Led11
better Fair Pay Act of 2009 (LLFPA). The LLFPA amended the op12
eration of several central pieces of employment legislation,
13
including Title VII. Section 3 amended Title VII so that an employer commits an unlawful employment practice each time it issues a
14
paycheck reflecting a discriminatory compensation decision. Employees such as Lilly Ledbetter may now proceed with Title VII claims
if they receive disparate pay within the EEOC charging period even
though the employer made the discriminatory pay decision outside of
15
the statute of limitations. In a nod to employer interests, Congress
16
put a two-year limit on back pay for successful plaintiffs.
The LLFPA is clearly a major victory for employees; nonetheless,
it is incapable of according sufficient relief to a particular class of
plaintiffs. This does not mean, however, that Congress failed to draft
legislation that adequately responds to Ledbetter. The deficiencies
stem from two necessary elements of Title VII⎯its 180/300-day statute of limitations and its two-year limit on back pay. The LLFPA
does not change the statute-of-limitations period, and thus, Title VII
the majority’s reasoning really entailed was that women will often be unable to sue
for pay discrimination.”).
7
See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H7638 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter) (characterizing the decision as a “grave mistake”).
8
See, e.g., Liz Gilchrist, Supreme Court Moves Backward on Equal Pay, NAT’L ORG.
FOR
WOMEN,
May
30,
2007,
http://www.now.org/issues/economic/
070530equalpay.html.
9
See supra notes 6–8.
10
Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2008, at A22.
11
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
12
Id. pmbl., 123 Stat. at 5 (amending “[T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964, and . . . modify[ing] the operation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973”).
13
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
14
§ 3, 123 Stat. at 5–6.
15
See infra Part II.B.
16
See id.

ONEILL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/21/2010 6:15 PM

COMMENT

1219

continues to offer relief only to employees that discover a compensa17
tion disparity within 180 days after their final paycheck. Additionally, employees are eligible to recover only two years of back pay even if
a discriminatory pay decision has affected an employee’s compensa18
tion for the past twenty years. These Title VII provisions are crucial
for the prompt processing of claims; however, without additional legislation, these limitations may unjustly bar a particular class of plaintiffs⎯employees working for employers with pay secrecy-andconfidentiality (PSC) rules—from receiving due compensation.
PSC rules are workplace rules that forbid employees from dis19
cussing wages with each other. They represent a subset of a larger
20
set of rules designed to set limitations on employee speech. While
many employers formalize these rules in employment policies, other
employers communicate their expectations of pay secrecy informal21
ly. A typical PSC rule implicitly or explicitly threatens violators with
22
disciplinary action, or even conditions employment on compliance.
Justice Ginsburg, in her powerful Ledbetter dissent, expressed
23
concern for employees in workplaces governed by PSC rules. The
dissenting Justice correctly noted that PSC rules make it difficult for
employees to determine whether their employers are discriminating
24
against them. Without the right to discuss wages, workers cannot be
certain that their employer is paying them equitably. Workers’ lack
of wage information is a key obstacle to their discovering and correcting pay disparities. PSC rules enable unscrupulous employers to discriminate against classes of employees while simultaneously preventing those employees from uncovering the discrimination.
Although some experts have concluded that PSC rules are prevalent in American workplaces, section 8 of the National Labor Rela25
tions Act (NLRA or Act) prohibits such rules. Courts consistently
have held that PSC rules constitute unfair labor practices, which vi17

See § 2000e-5(e)(1).
See § 3, 123 Stat. at 6.
19
See infra notes 103–112 and accompanying text.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649−50 & n.3 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
24
Id.
25
See infra Part IV.A.
18
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olate employees’ rights under section 7 of the NLRA to engage in
26
concerted activity. Additionally, several states have enacted legisla27
tion prohibiting PSC rules and encouraging wage transparency.
Unfortunately, existing federal and state laws concerning PSC
rules are unable to prevent the promulgation of potentially harmful
policies because the laws are fundamentally flawed in their design
28
and operation. Congress can remedy these laws’ shortcomings by
passing statutory reform that removes jurisdiction over PSC rules
from the province of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) and effectively preventing the promulgation of PSC rules in
American workplaces.
Part II of this Comment discusses the recent enactment of the
LLFPA. That section summarizes the Court’s decision in Ledbetter, reviews Congress’s response, and analyzes the LLFPA’s inherent inability to fully protect employees in workplaces that maintain PSC rules.
Part III of this Comment provides an overview of PSC rules. That section discusses the prevalence of PSC rules in American workplaces,
explains why and how employers promulgate and enforce PSC rules,
and summarizes the purported benefits to employers that utilize PSC
rules. Part IV details the statutory landscape currently governing PSC
rules—the NLRA and four state statutes. Part V explains why the current statutory regime governing PSC rules is inadequate. Part VI outlines potential legislative solutions to the continuing promulgation of
PSC rules. That section presents recommendations on how federal
legislators can effectively address the largest problems undermining
legislation currently regulating PSC rules⎯its failure to protect supervisors or provide adequate incentive for compliance. Congress
should pass legislation that exempts PSC rules from NLRA regulation, levies civil fines on violators, allows plaintiffs to sue for punitive
damages, and extends the right to wage discussion to supervisory employees. A model for future congressional legislation that is capable
of effectively eliminating PSC rules from American workplaces closes
that section. Finally, Part VII concludes this Comment by emphasizing the need for legislation that eliminates PSC rules to accomplish
the LLFPA’s goal of ending compensation discrimination.

26
27
28

See id.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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II. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
Pay discrimination going unnoticed by victimized employees is a
serious danger inherent in PSC rules because employers conceal the
discrimination by silencing wage discussion. A lack of wage transparency among coworkers creates difficulty for employees to determine
the existence of wage discrepancies or discrimination. In May 2007,
the Supreme Court compounded the danger of PSC rules in Ledbetter
29
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. The majority held that a paycheck reflecting prior discriminatory decisions does not restart the EEOC
charging period, which forecloses the opportunity to bring a Title VII
30
claim for many victims of pay discrimination. This decision was particularly ominous for employees whose employers promulgated PSC
rules. Even if such employees were fortunate enough to realize that
their employer was paying them unfairly, they likely could not make
this discovery within the stringent 180-day filing period.
Less than two years later, the 111th Congress, with the support
of President Obama, made an important first step toward reversing
the potential inequities resulting from Ledbetter and PSC rules by passing the LLFPA into law. The LLFPA essentially reversed Ledbetter’s
holding that a paycheck reflective of prior compensation discrimination cannot serve as a “discrete act” for the purpose of restarting the
31
EEOC charging period. The LLFPA was a crucial step in achieving
equal pay for equal work. Nonetheless, it does not fully alleviate
problems flowing from the existence of PSC rules. Employees who
are unable to discern whether they are receiving disparate pay because of PSC rules will still encounter two specific problems. First,
the LLFPA does not offer back pay for discrimination occurring more
than two years prior to the charge. Second, the current law leaves
without recourse plaintiffs who do not discover discrimination until
180/300 days after their final paycheck.
A. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
In 1979, Goodyear hired Lilly Ledbetter as a production supervi32
sor in its Gadsden, Alabama plant. Six years later, management
29

550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
30
See id. at 625.
31
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, §§ 2−3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6.
32
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
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promoted her to the newly created position of Area Manager after
she scored the second highest among more than forty-five applicants
33
for the position. In January 1998, management transferred Ledbetter to the position of Technology Engineer, and in November of that
34
year, she took an early retirement.
Pay records and testimony demonstrated that in 1997, Goodyear
35
paid Ledbetter much less than male employees in the same position.
The pay discrepancies between Ledbetter and men in the same posi36
tion ranged from 15–40 percent. Her pay was so low that it fell be37
low the minimum salary set by Goodyear’s policy for her position.
Long after the first pay decision that she challenged, Ledbetter filed a
38
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. After receiving her rightto-sue letter from the EEOC, Ledbetter filed suit in the Northern Dis39
trict of Alabama and alleged pay discrimination under Title VII.
Ledbetter claimed that her disparate pay was the consequence of
40
discrimination. Three pieces of evidence supported this allegation.
First, she demonstrated that her performance rankings were not ac41
curate reflections of her performance. Early in her career at Goodyear, Ledbetter’s direct supervisor threatened to give her additional
42
evaluations if she did not succumb to his sexual advances. Although
management moved Ledbetter to a different supervisor, Goodyear
later reassigned her former harasser to the role of her Performance
43
Auditor. Once again, he made advances that she rejected, which re44
sulted in more poor evaluations. Ledbetter also revealed that in
1996, another of her supervisors gave her a poor performance evalua33

Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
34
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1174−75.
35
Id. at 1174.
36
Id.
37
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 3.
38
See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175.
39
Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is an “unlawful employment practice” to discriminate “against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2006).
40
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1175, 1180.
41
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 5–6.
44
Id. at 6.
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tion while also recommending her for the company’s “Top Perfor45
mance Award.”
Second, Ledbetter presented testimony of other
female Goodyear employees who stated that Goodyear discriminated
46
against them. Third, Ledbetter testified that other plant officials
47
made biased remarks during her time at Goodyear.
Goodyear argued that the pay discrepancy arose naturally from
48
its “neutral merit system.” Under this system, the Business Center
Manager (Manager) would make recommendations about who
49
should receive raises and how much their raises should be. The
Manager based the recommendations on performance, subjective
50
impressions, and Performance Auditors’ reports. Goodyear consistently gave Ledbetter smaller raises than those that were to her male
51
counterparts or no raises at all. The company contended that the
52
discrepancies were simply a result of her poor performance.
The jury found in favor of Ledbetter and awarded her back pay
53
and damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and found that Ledbetter failed to file a timely
54
charge within the statutory charging period for a Title VII claim.
The statute requires plaintiffs to file a charge with the EEOC within
55
180/300 days of the unlawful employment practice. The Court of
Appeals concluded that Ledbetter’s claims based on the 1980s and
mid-1990s pay decisions were untimely and that no reasonable juror
45

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
47
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 8.
48
Id. at 5. See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169,
1172−73 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the “merit compensation system”), aff’d, 550
U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
49
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1172.
50
Id. (stating that the recommendations were based “primarily” on performance
but that the details of the system were not worth extended discussion); Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5.
51
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1174−75.
52
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 33, at 5. See also Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at
1173−75 (discussing Goodyear management’s appraisals of Ledbetter’s performance).
53
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27406, at *1−5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
54
Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1171.
55
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
46
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could find that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent while making the only two pay decisions occurring within the 180-day period
prior to Ledbetter’s charge⎯decisions made in 1997 and 1998—to
56
deny her a raise. Ledbetter’s petition for a writ of certiorari did not
contest the Eleventh Circuit’s findings regarding these final two pay
decisions. Instead, she framed the issue as
[w]hether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during
the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations
57
period.

Justice Alito, writing for a five-to-four majority, denied Ledbetter’s Title VII claim and held that the applicable limitations period of
58
180 days had run before she filed her EEOC questionnaire. The
Court found that the charging period for the decisions made with
discriminatory intent—the early 1980s and mid-1990s retaliatory
59
evaluations—had long since expired. The majority explained that
paychecks reflecting earlier pay decisions based on these negative
evaluations were merely effects of past discrimination and did not
constitute discrete instances of discrimination because, viewed alone,
60
they lacked the requisite discriminatory intent. In sum, the Court
held that the EEOC charging period begins running with an act of

56

Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1178.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
58
See id. at 621–43. An EEOC intake questionnaire solicits preliminary information from the aggrieved party. Laurie M. Stegman, An Administrative Battle of the
Forms: The EEOC’s Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 MICH. L. REV.
124, 125 (1992). Ledbetter did not include a discriminatory-pay claim until she filed
a formal charge in July 1998. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622 n.1. The parties, however, assumed that the EEOC charging period began running on September 26, 1997⎯the
date that she filed her intake questionnaire. Id. at 622 & n.1. The court likewise assumed that the filing of the questionnaire initiated the EEOC charging period. Id. at
622 n.1. In February 2008, the Supreme Court held that “a filing is deemed a charge
if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and appropriate relief on the employee’s behalf.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 533 U.S. 389,
404 (2008). The Court concluded that EEOC intake questionnaires satisfy this test
and thus constitute formal charges for the purpose of determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the statutory filing requirements. Id.
59
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628.
60
Id. at 629.
57
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discrimination and is not renewed each time that a victim suffers an
61
effect of the prior discrimination.
The majority based its stringent adherence to the filing deadline
on a policy argument that “[s]tatutes of limitations serve a policy of
62
repose.” The 180-day policy, Justice Alito contended, works to balance aggrieved employees’ interests with employers’ interest in swift
63
processing of employment-discrimination charges. The Court explained that the short filing deadline reflects Congress’s intent to en64
courage prompt processing of Title VII allegations. Without relatively short deadlines, employers would need to defend charges
65
arising from employment decisions that occurred long ago. This
consideration was particularly relevant to Lilly Ledbetter. Her discrimination claim rested on the misconduct of a Goodyear employee
who retaliated against her for rejecting his sexual advances in the ear66
ly 1980s and mid-1990s. Ledbetter argued that this employee’s misconduct was the foundation for negative performance evaluations
67
that caused her to receive disparate pay. At the time of trial, this su68
pervisor had died and thus could not testify. A timely charge would
have avoided this evidentiary problem.
The majority cited the Court’s precedent supporting its argument that continuing adverse consequences of past discrimination do
69
not restart the EEOC charging period. The Court also addressed
61
Id. at 628 (“A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does
not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.”).
62
Id. at 630.
63
Id. at 642.
64
Id. at 630.
65
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630.
66
Id. at 632 n.4.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 625–30. The Court relied primarily on two Supreme Court cases. Id. at
625−26. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the defendant’s policy
that refused to employ married flight attendants forced the plaintiff to resign. Id. at
554. Years later, the employer rehired the plaintiff but regarded her as a new employee. Id. at 555. Her status as a new employee had a negative impact on her seniority status. Id. The plaintiff sued on the grounds that the present effect of the
company’s illegal act, that is, forcing her to resign based on marital status, renewed
the statutory filing period. Id. at 557. The Court denied her claim and concluded
that the continuing effects of the past discrimination did not constitute a new claim.
Id. at 558. In Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the employer denied
the plaintiff tenure but granted him a final, nonrenewable one-year contract. Id. at
252–53. The employee sued, alleged that the school discharged him based on na-
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70

Bazemore v. Friday, which appeared on the surface to support the notion that pay discrimination was a continuing violation: “Each week’s
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white
is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this
71
pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.” This language, Ledbetter and the dissent argued, meant that the 180-day period ran anew from each paycheck that reflected the prior discrimi72
natory decision. Justice Alito, however, distinguished Bazemore by
explaining that the decision stands for the proposition that paychecks
trigger new EEOC charging periods only when the pay structure is
73
discriminatory on its face. A new charging period is not triggered
when employees receive paychecks pursuant to a facially nondiscri74
minatory pay system. The Court thus held that Bazemore did not re75
quire a different result.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that with each new paycheck,
Goodyear contributed to the accumulating harm caused by its man76
agers’ sexual discrimination. The Justice posited that each payment
infected by the previous act of discrimination should constitute an
77
unlawful employment practice. Ginsburg cited to Bazemore to support this position, but at its core, the dissenting opinion presents a
policy argument that pay-discrimination claims are unique because
the discrete act is less conspicuous than other types of discriminatory
acts:
The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimination
with respect to compensation that Ledbetter suffered does not fit
within the category of singular discrete acts “easy to identify.” A
worker knows immediately if she is denied a promotion or transfer, if she is fired or refused employment. And promotions, trans-

tional origin, and argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the point of his
termination. Id. at 254–55. The court denied his claim and held that his termination was merely an effect of the denial of tenure. Id. at 257–58. The statute of limitations began running after the illegal employment decision⎯the denial of tenure. Id.
70
478 U.S. 385 (1986).
71
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 635 (2007) (quoting
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395−96), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
72
Id. at 633; id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 637 (majority opinion).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 648−49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 646, 655 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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fers, hirings, and firings are generally public events, known to coworkers. When an employer makes a decision of such open and
definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an
explanation and evaluate it for pretext. Compensation disparities, in contrast, are often hidden from sight. It is not unusual,
decisions in point illustrate, for management to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their
78
own salaries.

The dissent then noted that Goodyear kept its employees’ salaries confidential and suggested that Ledbetter did not know that
79
Goodyear was discriminating against her. Essentially, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion highlights the concealed nature of pay discrimination
and argues that the EEOC charging period should restart each time
80
that an employee is harmed by its effects. The dissent contended
that this would avoid time barring potential plaintiffs who may not
have known about the discrimination until after the filing period has
81
expired.
B. Congress’s Response to Ledbetter
At the conclusion of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg called on
Congress to “correct th[e] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title

78

Id. at 649−50. The majority did not find merit in Justice Ginsburg’s policy argument:
Ledbetter’s policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay
claims find no support in the statute and are inconsistent with our precedents. We apply the statute as written, and this means that any unlawful employment practice, including those involving compensation,
must be presented to the EEOC within the period prescribed by the
statute.
Id. at 642−43 (majority opinion).
79
Id. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The record does not indicate that Goodyear had a PSC rule; it only indicates that Goodyear kept salaries confidential, and
management made sure that it always locked up pay-rate tables. Brief for PetitionerAppellant, supra note 33, at 26. The Los Angeles Times reported that “Ledbetter had
suspected for years that her male co-workers were being paid more, but she did not
have proof until shortly before her retirement, when someone anonymously left
documents in her work mailbox showing what three male managers earned.” Nicole
Gaouette, House Bill to Lift Limits on Pay Suits, L.A.TIMES, July 31, 2007, at A12. In an
op-ed piece, Ledbetter wrote, “How many workers know what their colleagues make?
Do you? I certainly didn’t until years after the fact.” Lilly Ledbetter, Equal Work, Unequal Pay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 31, 2007, at 9, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0731/p09s01-coop.html.
80
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645−46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81
Id.

ONEILL (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

1228

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/21/2010 6:15 PM

[Vol. 40:1217

82

VII.” California Representative George Miller responded swiftly by
83
introducing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 in the House of
Representatives on June 22, 2007, less than one month after Justice
84
Alito handed down the Ledbetter decision. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2007 would have amended Title VII so that each paycheck
affected by a past discriminatory pay decision would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice for the purposes of the EEOC statute of
85
limitations period.
But before the House of Representatives voted on the bill, President Bush issued a statement pledging to veto any legislation passed
86
in response to Ledbetter. The President’s Statement of Administrative
Policy, communicating the Bush Administration’s opposition to the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, argued that the bill “would serve
to impede justice and undermine the important goal of having alle87
gations of discrimination expeditiously resolved.” Against a backdrop of presidential disapproval, the outlook for the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2007 was grim from the beginning. Nonetheless, the
bill passed in the House on July 31, 2007, by a vote of 225 to 199, but
88
the passage would prove to be a temporary victory. Congress effectively killed the bill on April 23, 2008, when a Senate cloture motion
terminated Senate debate or the possibility of voting on the bill by
89
roll call.
In 2009, a new president and new Congress reopened the possibility of a legislative solution to Ledbetter. On January 8, 2009, Mary90
land Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the LLFPA. The LLFPA,
82

Id. at 661.
H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007).
84
153 CONG. REC. H7010 (daily ed. June 22, 2007).
85
Id. The Act also would have amended the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 and modified the operation of both the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. H.R. 2831.
86
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, H.R. 2831—LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007 (2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2831sap-r.pdf.
87
Id.
88
153 CONG. REC. D1097 (daily ed. July 31, 2007).
89
Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Pay and Title VII: Filing a Timely Claim, 41 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 389 (2008) (noting that the Senate cloture motion made “uncomplicated passage of the bill unlikely”).
90
155 CONG. REC. S228 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mikulski). The
Senate and House passed the LLFPA on January 22, 2009, and January 27, 2009, respectively. 155 CONG. REC. S775 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H556 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 2009). President Obama signed the bill into law on January 29, 2009.
83
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using the same language as the 2007 bill, amended Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and modified the operation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Reha91
bilitation Act of 1973. Section 3 of the LLFPA, which is the crux of
the new law, amended section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and directly addressed the core criticism against Ledbetter:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted,
when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected
by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
92
practice.

Significantly, the statute limits damages so that aggrieved parties may
only recover back pay for up to two years prior to the filing of the
93
charge.
Section 6 of the LLFPA reveals Congress’s intent that the statute
apply retroactively to claims based on pay decisions made prior to the
94
statute’s enactment. The statute reads, “This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect as if enacted on May 28, 2007,”
95
which was the day before the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter. Rather than protect only future victims of pay discrimination, the statute
“attempts to eradicate Ledbetter root and branch—as if it were never
96
97
the law.” In light of the Court’s holding in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Congress appears to have acted within its authority by permitting
98
courts to retroactively apply the new law. Plaintiffs whose claims
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetterweb.html?_r=1&ref=lilly_m_ledbetter
91
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, pmbl., 123 Stat. 5, 5.
92
Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 5–6 (emphasis added).
93
Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 6.
94
Id. § 6, 123 Stat. at 7.
95
Id.; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
96
Charles Sullivan, Sullivan on the Retroactivity of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, Feb. 9, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
laborprof_blog/2009/02/sullivan-on-t-1.html (follow “Retroactivity.doc” hyperlink).
97
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
98
Sullivan, supra note 96 (“[T]he Plaut Court was receptive to Congress changing
the law for pending cases, stating that any bar on prescribing rules of decision for the
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were once dead in the wake of Ledbetter may now proceed with dis99
crimination suits premised on pay decisions made years ago.
The LLFPA clearly signifies a victory for employees and Ledbetter’s critics and dissenting justices. The statute lengthens the window
for pay-discrimination claims so that discrimination remains actiona100
ble for as long as it affects an employee’s compensation. Two elements of the LLFPA’s operation, however, limit its ability to compensate some victims of pay discrimination appropriately.
First,
aggrieved employees may only recover back pay for up to two years
101
preceding the filing of their claim. A plaintiff like Lilly Ledbetter,
for example, could only recover two years of back pay despite having
received disparate pay for almost twenty years. Second, Title VII
claims based on pay discrimination remain subject to the EEOC’s
102
180-day statute of limitations period. Employees who fail to discover pay discrimination until six months after their last paycheck remain remediless.
These two particular limitations have the potential to bar relief
unfairly from employees whose employers promulgate PSC rules. In
such workplaces, employees have a difficult time discovering whether
their employer is paying them fairly. If the employee is fortunate
enough to uncover the discrimination, she is only eligible for two
years of back pay even if she received disparate pay for decades. Additionally, a PSC rule may conceal wage discrimination for the entire
length of the EEOC charging period—that is, 180 days after an employee’s final paycheck—and thus leave employees without recourse
if they manage to uncover the disparate pay after their tenure with
the employer.
Additional legislation is necessary to prevent PSC rules from interfering with the rights accorded to employees by Title VII. The solution, however, does not involve altering the 180-day charging period or the two-year limit on back pay. These elements of Title VII
represent important political compromises and encourage the
prompt processing of discrimination claims, and thus should not be

judiciary in pending cases ‘does not take hold when Congress amend[s] applicable
law.’” (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 216)).
99
The new law cannot revitalize Lilly Ledbetter’s claims, however, because the
Court, in Plaut, held that the separation-of-powers doctrine prohibited Congress
from reviving suits in which a final judgment has been entered. Id.
100
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6.
101
Id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 6.
102
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
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disturbed. Further legislation must seek to eradicate the root of the
problem⎯PSC rules.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF PSC RULES
PSC rules are workplace rules that forbid employees from dis103
cussing their compensation with coworkers. Employers may promulgate these rules in an employment manual or orally and informal104
Employers may convey PSC rules “at the time of hiring or at
ly.
105
some later point during” an employee’s tenure.
The grant of a
raise is an example of a post-hiring situation in which some employers feel that they must communicate expectations of pay secrecy to
106
employees.
In addition to different modes of promulgation, PSC
rules also differ in scope. While most formal PSC rules forbid wage
discussion in all forms at the workplace, some employers promulgate
benign PSC rules that prohibit only discussion of “confidential in107
formation.” For example, employers often forbid members of their
payroll departments from disclosing compensation information “ob108
tained in the course of [their] duties.” Typical PSC rules, whether
informal or formal, stress the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of compensation information and provide for disciplinary
109
action in the event that an employee discloses her wage.
PSC rules are a subset of broader employer rules that limit what
110
employees may say while at work. Rules restricting employees’ right
to speak freely in the workplace take many different forms. Sexual103

Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the National
Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 124 (2003).
104
Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics. Sure. Salary? No Way, 25
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 171 (2004).
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“[The employer] informed [employees] that they would be receiving a fifty-cent
raise. [The employer] ‘told [the employees], together, not to say anything to the
other girls in the kitchen because they were not getting a raise.’”).
107
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124.
108
See id.
109
For a good example of the language used in a typical formal PSC rule, see Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 168 (1997). Upon hiring, the employer distributed a handbook to many or all employees that included the following
PSC rule: “An employee’s earnings are a confidential matter between the employee
and his earnings supervisor. Earnings may not be discussed among fellow employees
and any such discussion will result in dismissal and/or disciplinary action at the supervisor’s discretion.” Id.
110
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124–25.
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harassment policies are an example of workplace rules that restrict
111
employees’ speech.
Policies that attempt to eliminate workplace
communication in any language other than English are another ex112
ample.
Academic researchers have not yet studied the prevalence of
113
PSC rules; however, some data suggests that the policies are quite
common in American workplaces. An informal, online poll provides
an approximation of how widespread PSC rules are in the
114
workplace. The survey, taken by HRnext.com, polled 329 unidentified individuals and found that “over one-third” had a formal PSC
115
rule in effect. Only one in fourteen respondents said that they had
116
“adopted a ‘pay openness’ policy.”
And 51 percent reported that
117
no policy regarding pay confidentiality existed in their workplaces.
This figure, however, may not reflect the number of workplaces that
“communicate expectations of employee pay confidentiality informal118
ly” without a written policy.

111

See generally Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J.
399 (1996) (discussing First Amendment defenses to Title VII sexual-harassment
claims that are based on speech alone); John F. Wirenius, Actions as Words, Words as
Actions: Sexual Harassment Law, the First Amendment and Verbal Acts, 28 WHITTIER L. REV.
905 (2007) (discussing the tension between sexual-harassment law and the First
Amendment).
112
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 124–25. The EEOC has issued guidelines
classifying workplace English-only rules as a form of national-origin discrimination
unless the rules are limited in scope and the employer can prove a legitimate business justification for the rule. Lisa L. Behm, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title
VII: The Need for Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 570–71 (1998). These guidelines, however, are
not binding on courts, and a number of different federal appellate courts have
upheld English-only rules. Id. at 570–72. See generally Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998
F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that an English-only policy violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on Hispanic employees); Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer’s rule that required
employees to speak English in public areas was not discriminatory as applied to a discharged worker who was capable of speaking English).
113
See Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 48 n.42 (2005).
114
See id. (“Given the lack of academic research on point, it is reasonable to use
any relevant available sources.”).
115
See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 125.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 171.
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Employers and academic researchers have cited four primary
benefits of PSC rules that help employers accomplish managerial objectives: (1) maintenance of a peaceful workplace; (2) increased
workplace privacy for employees; (3) labor-market immobility; and
(4) greater freedom for employers regarding compensation decisions. These purported benefits overlap so that some of the benefits
share common elements. For example, the avoidance of jealousy
among employees resulting from wage secrecy supposedly produces
the first and fourth purported benefits⎯decreased workplace conflict
119
and more accurate compensation systems. Some of these justifications may arguably provide employees with incidental benefits; however, the purported benefits generally undermine employees’ interests.
The first alleged benefit is that PSC rules help employers main120
tain a peaceful workplace.
Employers argue that PSC rules help
121
avoid conflicts and foster peace in two ways.
First, PSC rules can
help reduce jealousy among employees and prevent loss of employee
122
morale by concealing pay differentials. Systems for rewarding indi123
viduals are imperfect and difficult to communicate to employees.
Without PSC rules, employees may hear about coworkers’ wages but
124
not about the reasons for any wage discrepancies.
Alternatively,
125
they may fail to understand those reasons even if known. A satisfied
employee may quickly become a malcontent if she learns that the
126
employer is paying more to a similarly situated coworker.
The
second way that PSC rules help to prevent workplace conflict is by limiting “influence behavior” that may result from pay-openness poli127
cies.
Influence behavior occurs when employees attempt to per128
suade their supervisors “to give them a raise.” This type of behavior
can result in conflict between a calculating employee and her super-

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See infra text accompanying notes 122–126, 149–151.
Adrienne Colella, Exposing Pay Secrecy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 61 (2007).
See id.
Id.
See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178.
See id.; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129.
See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at

129.
126
127
128

Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 178.
See id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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129

visor or other coworkers.
Some economists argue that the cost of
the influencing behavior and its resulting conflict make PSC rules
130
more efficient than pay-openness policies.
The second claimed benefit of PSC rules is enhanced
131
Employee surveys have found
workplace privacy for employees.
132
that most employees favor PSC rules.
The strong norm in American culture that disapproves of discussing compensation strengthens
133
Enhanced privacy may offer incithe reliability of these findings.
dental benefits to employees, but employers enjoy the greatest
“perks” resulting from enhanced privacy in the workplace, such as re134
tention, satisfaction, commitment, and performance.
The third asserted benefit to employers from PSC rules is labor135
market immobility. Many productive employees, who might otherwise leave their employers if they knew what their coworkers were
136
paid, stay because they are ignorant of their relatively low pay. Additionally, many workers, staying with their employers only during
economic downturns, may wait for the economy to improve before
137
moving on to better employment opportunities. Pay openness and
employees’ ability to discuss job offers that coworkers receive facili138
tates this type of labor mobility. PSC rules enable employers to lim139
it labor-market mobility by preventing employee opportunism.
Aside from promoting workplace stability, labor-market immobility
has the additional benefit for employers of avoiding the costs incidental to labor transitions, such as recruiting and training replace140
ment employees.
This particular benefit helps illustrate the point

129

Id.
See id.; Colella, supra note 120, at 61.
131
Colella, supra note 120, at 62.
132
Id.
133
See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 168 (citing Abby Ellin, Want to Stop the
Conversation? Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, § 3, at 9) (observing
that discussion of compensation is generally considered “crass” in America); Colella,
supra note 120, at 62.
134
Colella, supra note 120, at 62.
135
Id.
136
See id.
137
Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 179.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Colella, supra note 120, at 62.
130
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that the perks enjoyed by employers from promulgating PSC rules of141
ten undermine employees’ interests.
The fourth purported benefit of PSC rules is that they give employers more freedom to set individual employees’ compensation and
to establish the relevant factors for determining compensation. PSC
rules provide the enhanced freedom to make compensation decisions
in two ways: (1) by permitting employers to reward employees for
firm-specific investments and (2) by increasing the breadth of the
pay-distribution scale through reduced potential for coworker conflict. As an initial matter, PSC rules allow employers to reward em142
ployees who make firm-specific investments. Employees frequently
143
confront alternatives concerning how their time is best spent. On
the one hand, they have opportunities at their workplace that will
help their careers at that particular firm but will not increase their
144
marketability in the larger labor market. On the other hand, they
can spend that same time working on projects that make them more
145
marketable in the broader workforce.
Employers often help employees deal with this dilemma by giving them large salary increases
146
to reward firm-specific commitments.
These types of raises are
highly subjective, difficult for coworkers to understand, and poten147
PSC rules help managers reward employees’
tially controversial.
148
firm-specific investment without causing workplace strife.
Additionally, PSC rules provide managers with latitude in compensation decisions by increasing the possible pay-distribution scale.
This rationale involves the potential conflict resulting from coworker
149
jealousy under a pay-openness policy.
If employees can discuss
their compensation, managers may feel the need to narrow the pay150
distribution range to avoid conflicts.
PSC rules enable managers
“to provide maximal separation in reward for performance” without
fearing conflict from those who are at the lower end of the pay

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

See supra text accompanying note 134.
Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 179–81.
See id. at 180.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 180–81.
See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 181.
See supra text accompanying notes 122–126.
Colella, supra note 120, at 61.
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151

scale. In the absence of PSC rules, employers may establish low pay
scales rather than reward valuable employees.
This tendency towards a narrower and lower pay scale is another
example of how a particular consequence stemming from PSC rules
represents a benefit to the employer and a detriment to some employees. Employers may assign valuable employees to the low end of
wide-ranging compensation scales for illegal reasons, such as using
race or gender as a motive, or simply by mistake the worth of such
employees. These employees have valid grounds for challenging employers’ pay decisions and should have the means to discover the differential between their compensation and that of their peers. Sometimes conflict is necessary to correct illegitimate equalities because
employees cannot always trust their employers to establish accurate
pay scales. If an employer makes a mistake in evaluating an employee
or discriminatory animus factors into an employer’s pay decision,
avoidance of conflict benefits only the employer.
The consequences of PSC rules have their own benefits and detriments from the employees’ perspective. Possibly the greatest benefit to employees is the enhanced sense of privacy that results from pay
secrecy. While pay openness may offer employees the opportunity to
evaluate their own salaries more accurately, survey data suggests that
employees favor PSC rules because of the heightened sense of priva152
cy. The more valuable employees also benefit when employers are
free to expand pay scales so that pay accurately reflects perfor153
mance.
On the other hand, employers, to the detriment of their employees, enjoy two of the benefits stemming from PSC rules. First,
decreasing labor mobility means that PSC rules discourage employees
154
from moving to jobs that fit better or pay more. Second, employers
claim that PSC rules help organizations correct pay inequities without
facing employees’ negative reactions and avoid claims of discrimina155
tion or other wrongdoing.
In this case, the damage suffered by
employees is clear. Employees have an interest in exposing pay in-

151

Id.
See id. at 62. This heightened sense of privacy likely benefits employers more
than employees. See supra text accompanying notes 131–134.
153
Colella, supra note 120, at 61. Some valuable employees may not benefit because of discrimination or employer error.
154
Id. at 60, 62.
155
Id. at 61.
152
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equalities, whether they are motivated by discrimination or not, so
that the employer can correct them.
IV. CURRENT STATUTORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
GOVERNING PSC RULES
Despite the prevalence of PSC rules, federal and state legislators
have recognized the potential downside of such policies and have
enacted legislation that treats the policies unfavorably. The NLRA is
federal legislation governing union workers and certain nonunion
156
employee conduct.
The responsibility for interpreting and apply157
ing the NLRA lies with the NLRB. The NLRB and reviewing courts
consistently hold that PSC rules violate employees’ right to engage in
concerted activity under the NLRA and constitute unfair labor prac158
tices. Additionally, several state legislatures have recognized the potential dangers engendered by PSC rules and have passed laws that
explicitly prohibit them.
A. The NLRA and PSC Rules
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 in response to strikes and
industrial strife resulting from some employers’ efforts to deny their
159
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. By providing
workers with full freedom to self-organize and choose bargaining
representatives, Congress tried to level bargaining inequalities between employees and employers to avoid future obstructions to the
160
flow of commerce.
The extension of rights designed to protect workers is found in
section 7 of the NLRA, entitled “Rights of employees, as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.,” which grants workers the unequivocal right to join labor unions and engage in “other concerted activ161
ities” for collective bargaining or other “mutual aid or protection.”
Under section 8(a)(1), employers that “interfere with, restrain, or
156

Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 131. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151−160
(2006).
157
See § 153 (announcing that the NLRB will continue in existence and describing
certain features of the NLRB); § 160; NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344
U.S. 344, 348 (1953) (“It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the
policies of the Act.”).
158
See, e.g., cases cited infra note 176.
159
§ 151.
160
Id.
161
Id. § 157.
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coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section
162
7]” thereby commit unfair labor practices and violate the NLRA.
To determine whether an employer has committed a section 8 viola163
tion, a three-part test generally applies. First, the NLRB or reviewing court asks whether the employer’s practice adversely affects its
164
employees’ section 7 rights. Next, if the practice does infringe on
section 7 rights, the employer must demonstrate a “substantial and
legitimate business reason” for the conduct or employment prac165
tice.
Finally, the NLRB or court applies a balancing test to determine whether the section 7 rights outweigh the employer’s proffered
166
business justification.
The NLRB does not actively seek out unfair labor practices. Rather, the Board reviews employment practices after an employee, un167
ion, or employer submits a formal allegation of an NLRA violation.
Under this scheme, the NLRB will not address a violation that em168
This reactive enforcement scheme
ployees accept or support.
stands in contrast to other administrative agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, which have the power to investigate
169
and enforce without waiting for complaints.
Section 10 provides the NLRB’s remedies for unfair labor prac170
tices. If the Board finds that an employer has committed an unfair
labor practice, it shall issue a cease-and-desist order and “take such
171
affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of th[e] [Act].”
The NLRB’s affirmative action is limited to reparative remedies, such
172
The available remedies illustrate
as reinstatement and back pay.
173
the Act’s general purpose, which is remedial rather than punitive.
The remedies aim to end the unfair labor practice and remove the

162

Id. § 158 (referring to § 157, which is section 7 of the NLRA).
See Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB., 142 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1998).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 188.
168
Id.
169
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (2006).
170
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
171
Id.
172
See id.; Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
173
Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
163
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consequences of the violation from the workplace. The NLRB may
not punish guilty employers beyond what is necessary to rid the
175
workplace of the violation’s effects.
The NLRB has heard complaints from workers regarding PSC
176
rules on many occasions. In the first step of the Board’s three-part
test for determining an unfair labor practice, the NLRB has consistently held that PSC rules encroach on workers’ section 7 right to en177
gage in “concerted activity for . . . mutual aid or protection.” Wage
178
levels are a chief concern of organizational activity, and dissatisfaction stemming from low wages is a key motivator of concerted activi179
ty. In light of this, wage discussion is considered a protected activi180
ty. Unqualified PSC rules, by nature, obstruct this recognized form
of concerted activity, and therefore, courts routinely find that PSC
181
rules obstruct employees’ section 7 rights.
After finding that an employer’s prohibition of wage discussion
impedes protected activity, the NLRB or a reviewing court moves to
the second and third steps: determining whether a legitimate business justification exists for the PSC rule and, if so, whether that justification outweighs the employees’ section 7 right to discuss wages.
The most common justification offered by employers in defense of
182
PSC rules is that the policies reduce jealousy among employees.
The NLRB and courts consistently reject this argument and hold that
the potential for limiting jealousy among employees is not a justifiable business reason to inhibit employees from engaging in protected
183
concerted activity.
Where employers have no legitimate business
justification to weigh against their infringement on section 7 rights,
174

Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 236.
Id.
176
See generally NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that oral promulgation of a PSC rule constituted an unfair labor practice);
Wilson Trophy Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer violated its employees’ section 7 rights by unconditionally forbidding wage discussion in the warehouse); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by maintaining an
unqualified, unwritten PSC rule).
177
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); see, e.g., cases cited supra note 176.
178
Main St., 218 F.3d at 537.
179
See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919.
180
See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 131.
181
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 176.
182
See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919; Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129.
183
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 129; see, e.g., Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919.
175
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the NLRB and reviewing courts reach the unavoidable conclusion
that PSC rules are unfair labor practices that constitute section
184
8(a)(1) violations.
But an important exception applies to the NLRB’s consistent,
unfavorable treatment of PSC rules. Modified PSC rules that prohibit
employee wage discussion only during working hours are generally
acceptable because they support an employer’s legitimate business
185
interest of maintaining workplace efficiency. To avoid unfair labor
practices, employers must not prohibit wage discussion during
“breaks, . . . lunch time, in the restroom, and before and after work
186
while employees [are in the workplace].”
The manner in which an employer communicates its prohibition
of wage discussion is immaterial to a court’s unfair-labor-practice determination: a rule may constitute a violation regardless of the mode
of communication. The NLRB and reviewing courts thus analyze
orally promulgated PSC rules no differently than formal, written PSC
187
rules.
The potential for orally communicated PSC rules to violate
the NLRA is important for several reasons. First, experts speculate
that informal, unwritten PSC rules are very common and that pay
188
secrecy is “the unwritten law” across American workplaces. Second,
verbal communication of workplace policies may be particularly
coercive because employees perceive that the employer is more likely
to enforce such policies than a policy hidden in an employment ma189
nual that employees may view as mere boilerplate.
Finally, if the
Board and reviewing courts did not consider orally promulgated PSC
rules to be unfair labor practices, employers could easily evade the
190
NLRA by issuing PSC rules orally.
The Board and reviewing courts have strongly protected the
right of employees to discuss their wages. Two examples of employer
action that violate the NLRA are illustrative of employers’ very limited
ability to institute PSC rules. First, an employer need not actually en-

184

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 . . . .”).
185
See Jeannette, 532 F.2d at 919 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 803 n.10 (1945)).
186
Wilson Trophy Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502, 1511 (8th Cir. 1993).
187
See NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2000).
188
Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 171.
189
See Main St., 218 F.3d at 538.
190
Id.
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force a PSC rule to violate section 8(a)(1). The mere existence of a
PSC rule constitutes an unfair labor practice, regardless of whether
192
an employer ignores or enforces the policy. The rationale behind
prohibiting even unenforced rules is that “mere maintenance” of a
pay-secrecy policy may “chill” employee wage discussion, a protected
193
section 7 employee activity.
Even intentional failure to enforce a
194
facially unlawful PSC rule will not vindicate the rule.
The NLRA’s proscription of PSC rules is also interpreted to outlaw provisions in employment manuals that do not explicitly forbid
pay discussions so long as employees could reasonably construe a
195
provision’s language to prohibit section 7 activity. In Cintas Corp. v.
NLRB, an employee handbook simply prohibited the disclosure of
196
“any information concerning . . . partners.” Clear evidence existed
to demonstrate that employees did not interpret the provision as restricting their right to disclose wage information: the employees post197
ed pictures of themselves with their wages around the workplace.
Despite the ambiguous language of the policy and the fact that the
employees did not interpret the policy as a PSC rule, the court agreed
with the Board’s determination that the policy was capable of imped198
ing employees’ section 7 rights. In sum, an employment policy may
violate section 8(a)(1) even though it does not explicitly forbid wage
discussion, employees do not interpret it as forbidding wage discus199
sion, and the employer does not enforce it.
The remedies imposed by the NLRB after it has determined that
a PSC rule violates employees’ section 7 rights are similar to the remedies for any unfair labor practice. In accordance with the remedi200
al purpose of the NLRA, remedies for employees in workplaces with
PSC rules are reparative rather than punitive. The NLRB and reviewing courts provide a number of different remedies to eliminate the

191

Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 463, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
See id.
193
See Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
194
Cintas, 482 F.3d at 466.
195
Id. at 467.
196
482 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The company referred to all employees as
“partners.” Id.
197
Id. at 467.
198
Id.
199
See supra notes 191−198 and accompanying text.
200
E.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 n.6 (2002);
Clover Fork Coal Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
192
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201

PSC rule and its effects.
These remedies fall into two categories:
remedies designed to repair the entire workplace and remedies designed to make whole individual employees whom their employer un202
lawfully discharged pursuant to an illegal PSC rule.
The Board uses two primary remedies to repair a workplace previously governed by an unlawful PSC rule. First, the NLRB will
203
mandate that the employer rescind the unlawful policy. If the employer formalized the policy in an employment manual, the NLRB
may order the employer to print new manuals and to redistribute the
204
revised version to all employees. Second, the Board will order the
employer to post notices in the workplace informing its employees of
the affirmative remedies provided to the unlawfully terminated em205
ployees and notifying them that the policy is no longer in effect.
The Board generally provides unlawfully discharged employees
with three principal remedies. First, the NLRB will order the employer to reinstate all employees terminated for violating a PSC
206
rule.
If those employees’ jobs no longer exist, the employer must
201

The NLRB promulgated the remedies in this section in Fredericksburg Glass and
Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165 (1997). The facts of the case provided the NLRB an
opportunity to grant every remedy typical of cases involving unlawful PSC rules. The
Fredericksburg order is a representative example of how the Board approaches cases
involving unlawful PSC rules, and it will guide this discussion of PSC-rule remedies.
In other pertinent case law, the Board or reviewing court provided for one or two of
the following sets of remedies cited to in Fredericksburg.
202
Generally, the NLRB will order both sets of remedies unless the employer did
not discharge an employee pursuant to the PSC rule, in which case the Board may
order only the first set of remedies. NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th
Cir. 1990), offers an example of a case where the employer terminated the employee
pursuant to a PSC rule, but the employee was not reinstated. The employee encountered performance evaluations while in his supervisor’s office. Id. at 361. Later that
morning, he shared the information with his fellow employees. Id. His supervisor
told him that the employer was not firing him for stealing information but for revealing the wages to his coworkers. Id. Upon receiving an unfair labor charge from the
discharged employee, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered that the employer
rescind the rule and post notice around the workplace, but the ALJ refused to reinstate the employee. Id. at 362. The Board reversed the ALJ’s order, but on appeal,
the Fifth Circuit held that “an employee’s right to discuss wage levels freely within
the workplace does not, and should not, extend to that employee the prerogative of
taking company papers. . . . Where ‘the purposes and polices of the Act would not
be effectuated by reinstatement’ or other remedial measures, then denial of the traditional remedies accorded under the Act is proper.” Id. at 364 (quoting NLRB v.
Big Three Welding Equip. Co., 359 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1966)).
203
See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 181 (1997).
204
See, e.g., id.
205
See, e.g., id.
206
See, e.g., id.
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find substantially equivalent positions or dismiss replacement hires to
207
make room for the reinstated employees. The employer must also
ensure that the dismissed employees do not suffer any prejudice to
208
seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed. Second,
employers are required to make whole the unlawfully discharged
plaintiffs for their loss of earnings or other benefits by supplying back
209
pay with interest. Finally, the NLRB will also order an employer to
expunge from its records all references to the unlawful termination
210
of the employees.
B. State Statutes Prohibiting PSC Rules
In the past twenty-seven years, four state legislatures enacted sta211
212
213
tutes outlawing PSC rules: Michigan, California, Vermont, and
214
215
Colorado. With the exception of the Colorado statute, which appears slightly broader in its protection of employees’ rights, the statutes utilize almost identical language to prohibit PSC rules. The
Vermont statute, typical of the state PSC prohibitions, reads as follows:
(B) No employer may do any of the following:
(i) Require, as a condition of employment, that an employee
refrain from disclosing the amount of his or her wages
(ii) Require an employee to sign a waiver or other document
that purports to deny the employee the right to disclose the
amount of his or her wages
(iii) Discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise discriminate
against an employee who discloses the amount of his or her wag
216
es.
207

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
209
See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass and Mirror, 323 N.L.R.B. at 181.
210
See, e.g., id.
211
See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.483a (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2008 legislation).
212
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 232 (West 2003).
213
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(8)(B) (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.).
214
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(h)(II)(C)(i) (LEXIS through 2009 legislation).
215
Rather than only protecting an employee’s right to disclose their wage, the
Colorado statute prohibits an employer from disciplining an employee “because the
employee inquired about, disclosed, compared, or otherwise discussed the employee’s wages.” Id.
216
§ 495(a)(8)(B).
208
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The relief available to aggrieved employees under the statutes
varies by state. On one end of the spectrum, Colorado’s statute offers
only minimal relief that is similar in substance to that available under
217
the NLRA.
The courts’ remedial options are limited to equitable
218
remedies such as reinstatement or back pay.
The California and
Michigan statutes fall in the middle of the spectrum, imposing civil
219
penalties on offending employers. The Vermont statute offers the
strongest remedies. In addition to back pay, reinstatement, and attorney’s fees, Vermont courts may impose a $10,000 civil penalty on
offending employers and grant punitive or treble damages to plain220
tiffs. Thus, the Vermont statute is unique in two ways. First, it is the
only state statute to offer punitive damages to plaintiffs. Second, the
statute imposes on the defendant a civil fine that is presumably designed to deter employers from instituting PSC rules. The Vermont
statute represents the most aggressive effort by a state legislature to
punish employers and deter them from promulgating PSC rules.
Case law involving any of the four state statutes is very sparse.
Only two suits have been filed accusing employers of promulgating
221
illegal PSC rules. The most recent case took place in 2002 after a
California employer allegedly terminated an employee for mention222
ing to coworkers that she did not receive a bonus. The employee,
using section 232 of the California Labor Code, which prohibits PSC
rules, filed a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
223
policy. Section 232 provided the statutory hook, or tether, for the

217

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-405 (LEXIS through 2009 legislation).
See id.; Continental Title Co. v. Dist. Court of Denver, 645 P.2d 1310, 1317
(1982) (“[T]his statute was intended to invoke only the equitable powers of the court
and not to create a legal claim for damages.”).
219
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West Supp. 2010); Reo v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 536
N.W.2d 556, 557–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“We recognize that our construction of
the act may result in a civil fine being the only remedy available under the act if the
petitioner’s claim is proven . . . . While we are cognizant of this result, we are without
authority to change it, given our interpretation of the statutes and the Legislature’s
failure to provide explicit remedies for violations of 13a.”).
220
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2458, 2461 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 495b (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.).
221
Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 210–11 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002). See generally Reo, 211 Mich. App. 364 (accusing employer of allegedly
terminating plaintiff for disclosing her wage).
222
Grant-Burton, 122 Cal Rptr. 2d at 210−11.
223
Id. at 213.
218
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224

employee’s public-policy claim. The statute demonstrated that public policy disfavored PSC rules and thus supported the employee’s
225
wrongful-termination claim.
V. WHY THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME IS INADEQUATE
The existing statutory regime governing PSC rules is inadequate
for three reasons. First, most employers lack incentives to remove existing PSC rules. Second, the existing scheme leaves a large class of
employees unprotected. Finally, the possibility exists that courts may
eventually hold that the NLRA preempts state statutes that make PSC
rules illegal.
A. The Futility of the NLRA
The chief deficiency of the NLRA’s ability to protect employees
against PSC rules is that the Act provides only limited incentive for
employers to remove PSC rules from their policies. The overarching
purpose of the NLRA is to offer victims of unfair labor practices remedial relief without resorting to punitive damages or civil penal226
ties. The NLRA limits the Board by providing remedial relief even
in situations where it believes that punitive damages or fines would
227
best “effectuate the policies of the Act.” The limited remedies provided to employees and workplaces restrained by PSC rules illustrate
228
the NLRA’s underlying policy of repairing rather than punishing.
Having only remedial powers, the NLRB cannot effectively deter
workplace PSC rules. Workplace prohibitions against certain activities, even if unenforced, have the effect of preventing or chilling
224

Public-policy claims must be “tethered” to statutory or constitutional provisions. Id. at 213–14.
225
Id. at 214.
226
Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
227
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235–36 (1938) (“[T]his authority to
order affirmative action does not go so far as to convey a punitive jurisdiction . . .
even though the Board be of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an order.”). The NLRB is also not permitted to take punitive action
with the hope of deterring a particular unfair labor practice. Florida Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1980) (“While . . . a penalty might have the effect of
deterring persons from violating the Act . . . , it is not warranted.”).
228
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); see, e.g., Wilson Trophy
Co. v. NLRB, 989 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1993) (providing for reinstatement and back
pay for employees who were fired for violating PSC rules); NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring employer to eliminate its PSC rule
even though plaintiff was not entitled to relief).
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those activities. Under the NLRA, employers may maintain unenforced PSC rules with the objective of chilling wage discussion. In the
employer’s worst-case scenario, an employee would bring the PSC
rule to the Board’s attention, and the Board would issue a cease-anddesist order. The harshest penalty that an unenforced PSC rule will
precipitate is an order to comply with the law despite the significant
chilling effect that the rule itself can have on section 7 rights. Even if
an employer enforces the PSC rule and fires violators, the employer
will only be slightly worse off than if the employer had always complied with the law because the remedy is merely reinstatement and
229
back pay.
As the NLRA is reactive in nature—that is, a petitioner
does not enforce it without a claim—most PSC rules will not be
230
Ignoring the law is easier and
brought to the NLRB’s attention.
more efficient for employers because the NLRA does not adequately
231
incentivize compliance.
232
The decline of unionization in American workplaces as well as
the fact that nonunion employees know little about their rights under
229

If the employer does not hire a replacement, it will pay for unrealized labor
costs—back pay—between termination and reinstatement. Alternatively, if the employer hires a replacement, it will pay double the normal wage of one employee.
230
See Bierman & Gely, supra note 104, at 188–89.
231
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 149 (“In this context . . . it is much easier
and efficient to simply ignore the law.”).
232
Although the rate of unionization among American workers has steadily declined over recent decades, legislation pending in Congress, if passed, may bring
about increased levels of unionization in the future. The Employee Free Choice Act
of 2009 (EFCA) amends section 9 of the NLRA to make it easier for unions to gain
certification as employees’ bargaining agent. See H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong.
(2009). Under the current system, the process leading to union certification begins
when “any person or labor organization acting on behalf of a substantial number of
employees” files a petition. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (2009). The petitioner must also produce evidence that a “substantial number”—that is, at least thirty percent—of employees want the union to represent them. Id. §§ 101.17, 101.18(a). This evidence
generally takes the form of signed authorization cards. § 101.17. Once a union
claims to represent the majority of employees in a workplace, the employer has the
right to demand a secret ballot election. Id. § 101.19. In 2009, elections were conducted in a median of thirty-seven days after the filing of a petition. NLRB,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
24
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/reports/PAR/2009/PAR2009.pdf. During
this time, employers frequently engage in aggressive anti-union campaigning and often utilize coercive and illegal measures to diminish the chances of a union victory
on election day. See KATE BRONFENBRENER, NO HOLDS BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION
OF
EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 2–3 (2009), available at
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/noholdsbarre
d.pdf. The EFCA prevents employers from utilizing pre-election coercive tactics by
eliminating an employer’s right to demand an election once a majority of employees
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the Act is increasing the likelihood of employers’ intentional non233
compliance with the NLRA.
In 1983, 20.1 percent of America’s
234
workforce belonged to a labor union.
This figure, steadily declin235
Aling, fell to 13.4 percent in 2000 and to 12.4 percent in 2008.
though section 7 provides nonunion employees with the same rights
as unionized workers, most nonunion workers are either ignorant of
the NLRA’s existence or believe that the Act does not apply to
236
them. Labor unions are more aware of their workers’ rights under
the law and consequently more likely to contest unlawful PSC rules.
The continuing decline of unionization in America will likely strengthen employers’ incentive to ignore the NLRA’s prohibition on PSC
rules because nonunion opposition to such policies is doubtful.
The second deficiency in the NLRA’s ability to protect employees against PSC rules involves the limited scope of section 7. The
NLRA’s extension of section 7 rights does not reach those employees
who qualify as supervisors under the Act’s definition and thus leaves a
large class of employees unprotected from PSC rules. Section 7, the
source of wage-discussion protection, only affords “employees” the
237
right to engage in concerted activity.
The NLRA states that “the
term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as
238
Case law has consistently affirmed that supervisory
a supervisor.”
239
employees have no section 7 rights. This gap in the NLRA’s protecmanifest a desire to be represented by a union. See H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong.
(2009). Under section 2 of the EFCA, if a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit sign valid authorization cards, the Board shall certify a labor union
without a secret ballot election. Id.
233
See Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 148–49.
234
News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union Members
in 2008, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
union2.pdf.
235
Id.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from
the Current Population Survey, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpslutabs.htm (last visited
May 21, 2010).
236
William Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century, 23 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002) (“The scope of coverage of section 7 and its application to nonunion employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of labor
law.”).
237
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
238
Id. § 152(3).
239
See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S.
181, 188 (1965) (“[Section] 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory employees the
rights to engage in self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities.”); NLRB v. Silver Bay Local 962, 498 F.2d 26, 28 (9th Cir. 1974) (“It has long
been recognized that supervisors are not entitled to the protection afforded ‘ordi-
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tion of workers is amplified by a very inclusive definition of the term
240
“supervisor.” The NLRA defines many types of employees as super241
visors that convention would probably regard as regular employees.
Additionally, the Board, representing the employee’s interest rather
than the employer’s interest, has the burden of proving the em242
ployees are not supervisors.
This makes it even more difficult for
employees who have even limited amounts of responsibility to gain
section 7 protection of wage discussion.
Ledbetter illustrates the potentially negative effects of the NLRA’s
exclusion of supervisors. Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at Goo243
dyear.
The dissent suggested that she did not discover that Goodyear was subjecting her to pay discrimination in part because of
244
If Ledbetter
Goodyear’s policy of confidentiality regarding pay.
suspected that she was a victim of pay discrimination within the 180day filing period, Goodyear could have legally obstructed her from
investigating her suspicions by maintaining a PSC rule. The same
Goodyear officials who discriminated against Ledbetter could threaten her with termination if she asked coworkers about their pay, and
the NLRA would provide her no recourse. The inequitable character
of the situation is clear: supervisors, such as Lilly Ledbetter, are also
vulnerable to pay discrimination and should be entitled to discuss
their wage with coworkers.

nary employees’ under the Act, and that ‘as to supervisors there can be no such thing
as a discriminatory discharge or an unfair labor practice.’”) (quoting NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 551 (9th Cir. 1960)); Mon River Towing, Inc. v.
NLRB, 421 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1969) (stating that section-7 “protection does not extend to supervisors”).
240
§ 152(11) (“[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.”).
241
See, e.g., NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971) (classifying a
secretary with access to confidential information as a supervisor); Eastern Greyhound
Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964) (classifying bus-line dispatchers as supervisors); Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 668 (1957) (finding that a handyman
on a freight vessel qualified as a supervisor).
242
E.g., Integrated Health Servs. v. NLRB, 191 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir. 1999).
243
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.
2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
244
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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B. The NLRA Should Preempt Existing State Statutes
Under the current interpretation of the NLRA, state statutes
prohibiting PSC rules are not a viable alternative to NLRB enforcement. The NLRA probably preempts state legislation prohibiting
PSC rules to the extent that the statutes protect non-supervisory employees.
Analysis regarding NLRA preemption of state or federal legislation begins with the Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego Building
245
Trades Council v. Garmon. In Garmon, Justice Frankfurter significantly limited the states’ ability to legislate on matters of labor relations
and provided the foundation for the NLRA preemption analysis:
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the
States as well as the federal court, must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state in246
terference with national policy is to be averted.”
The Supreme
Court determined that state jurisdiction yields to the NLRA when the
state attempts to regulate activities arguably protected by section 7 or
247
outlawed by section 8.
Although Garmon remains the basic standard for NLRA preemption of state legislation, subsequent decisions have adjusted the standard and provided certain exceptions. In 1978, the Supreme Court
tweaked the Garmon standard and held that when alleged conduct
may be “arguably prohibited” by the Garmon preemption test, the critical issue is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is
identical . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but
248
was not, presented to the Labor Board.”
In addition to this adjustment of the Garmon standard, three
249
primary exceptions apply to the preemption doctrine. The first two
exceptions are contained in the Garmon opinion itself and have been
adopted and expanded by subsequent courts. First, the NLRA does
not preempt state regulation of activity that is merely a peripheral

245

359 U.S. 236 (1959); see Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F.
Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Any analysis regarding NLRA preemption of
RICO must necessarily begin with the Supreme Court decision in San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon.”).
246
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
247
Id. at 244.
248
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 197 (1978).
249
See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1977).
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250

concern of the NLRA.
Second, the NLRA will not preempt state
regulation of an activity that touches interests “deeply rooted in local
251
feeling and responsibility.” In addition to the two judicially created
exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, the Court recognizes congressional exclusions of certain classes of cases from the Board’s exclusive
252
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the existing state statutes prohibiting PSC rules apply to non-supervisory employees, the NLRA
should preempt them. Under the standard for preemption articulated in Garmon, state legislation may not regulate activity surrounding PSC rules if the NLRB has already recognized a right under section 7 or an unfair labor practice under section 8 involving wage
253
disclosure. The NLRB and reviewing courts have repeatedly recognized a right under section 7 to disclose one’s wage and have recognized that prohibiting wage disclosure through maintenance of PSC
254
rules constitutes an unfair labor practice. When judged under the
preemption standard articulated in Sears, state statutes are even more
255
clearly preempted. Bringing a claim under state statutes for interference with one’s right to disclose one’s wage is identical to a claim
that can be brought to the NLRB.
Finally, the state statutes do not fall within any of the three exceptions to the Garmon doctrine because wage discussion is not peri256
pheral to the NLRA, wage discussion does not touch and concern a

250

Id. at 296; see, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)
(holding that the NLRA does not preempt a civil action in state court for libel when
a union makes false, defamatory remarks during a union-organizing campaign).
251
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
252
Farmer, 430 U.S. at 297 n.8; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (2006) (allowing parties
to bring suit in federal district court to recover damages from violations of section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA even though the unfair labor practice is remediable by the
Board). Section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA also permits the Board to decline jurisdiction
over “any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction,” and thus, the Board may
leave jurisdiction in the hands of state or federal courts. Id. § 164(c)(1).
253
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
254
See supra Part IV.A.
255
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 197 (1978).
256
See Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976)
(“[D]issatisfaction due to low wages is the grist on which concerted activity feeds.”).
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257

particular locality, and Congress has yet to carve out the NLRB’s jurisdiction over PSC rules. As applied to PSC rules, the NLRA
preemption doctrine leads to the conclusion that the NLRA
preempts any state statutes regarding PSC rules to the extent that
they protect non-supervisory employees.
In 2002, the California Court of Appeals suggested that the
NLRA may preempt section 225 of the California Labor Code but left
258
the issue to the trial court on remand. Six years later, the California Court of Appeals revisited the issue of preemption in the context
of section 232.5, a provision of California Labor Code that extends
section 225 protections regarding wage disclosure to working259
condition disclosure. In Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc., the plain260
tiff brought a public-policy claim based on section 225.5. The court
found that the NLRA preempted the statute and thus rendered useless any future attempt by non-supervisory employees to find protec261
tion under the statute. Because section 232.5 is almost identical to
section 232, future courts will likely conclude that the NLRA
preempts the state’s statute prohibiting PSC rules.
Although state statutes will likely prove largely ineffective because of preemption, the statutes will continue to protect the supervisors’ right to disclose their wages because the NLRA does not
preempt this protection. None of the four state statutes has a definition of “employee” that explicitly excludes supervisors. Rather, the
262
definitions appear to include anybody hired by the employer. The
257

The notion that wage discussion does not touch and concern a particular locality is evidenced by the fact that the state statutes exist in four very different states:
Michigan, California, Vermont, and Colorado. See infra note 262 and accompanying
text.
258
Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 218 n.2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
259
72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
260
Id. at 442.
261
Id. at 445, 448.
262
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401(2) (LEXIS through 2009 legislation) (“‘Employee’ means any person employed by an employer, except a person in the domestic
service of any person.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.471(1)(c) (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2008 legislation) (“‘Employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(2) (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (“‘Employee’
means every person who may be permitted, required or directed by any employer, in
consideration of direct or indirect gain or profit, to perform services.”). The California Labor Code does not define “employee” within the article that protects wage
disclosure. But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 350(b) (West 2003) (“‘Employee’ means every
person, including aliens and minors, rendering actual service in any business for an
employer, whether gratuitously or for wages or pay, whether the wages or pay are
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state statutes’ protection of supervisors does not overlap with any protection offered by section 7 of the NLRA. The NLRA explicitly excludes supervisors from the rights afforded to employees by section 7.
In fact, section 7 arguably does not protect the activity in question—
supervisor wage disclosure. Therefore, the NLRA does not preempt
state legislation that regulates the matter.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Any meaningful reform of legislation concerning PSC rules must
accomplish three goals to be effective. First, reform must provide incentives for employers to abandon PSC rules and deterrents for employers who are considering adopting PSC rules. Second, legislative
reform must extend the right to engage in wage discussion to supervisory employees. Finally, new laws should mandate that employers
provide employees notice of their right to engage in wage discussion.
Three proposed solutions could be used to attempt to satisfy these
three goals.
In the first proposed solution, congressional or judicial reform
gives the NLRA bite and creates a notice requirement, and state statutes operate only to the extent that they do not preempt the
NLRA—providing rights to supervisory employees. Enabling the
NLRB to impose civil penalties or punitive damages against employers who maintain PSC rules will help prevent employers from adopting the rules at all. Unlike the existing situation under the NLRA,
263
employers will have incentives to abandon PSC rules.
In addition,
the NLRA will only preempt state legislation providing coverage to all
employees in cases involving non-supervisory employees. Supervisors
will have an avenue of relief outside of the NLRB.
Several problems make this first option impractical. First,
reform of the NLRA is unlikely. Prior to the Employee Free Choice
264
Act (EFCA), the 95th Congress made the last attempt to strengthen
measured by the standard of time, piece, task, commission, or other method of calculation, and whether the service is rendered on a commission, concessionaire, or other basis.”); Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 216 n.1 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (“Labor Code Section 923 does protect the concerted activities of supervisors.”).
263
The incentive is that the cost of civil penalties and punitive damages outweighs
the utility of maintaining PSC rules. Accordingly, legislation should provide a generous punitive-damages cap and civil penalties that exact meaningful financial
harm on violators.
264
See supra note 232 and accompanying text. Although Democrats control Congress and the White House, the card-check system proposed under the EFCA would
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the NLRA, and it was successfully filibustered despite Democratic ma265
jorities in both houses and a pro-union president, Jimmy Carter.
266
Second, in light of the historically remedial nature of the NLRA,
Congress or the NLRB will very likely be unwilling to depart from
such long precedent. Third, much like the current situation, this option results in a fragmented regulatory framework. While the NLRA
would always cover non-supervisory employees, supervisors would only find protection in states that outlaw PSC rules. State reform has
generated only four statutes banning PSC rules in twenty-seven years.
Progress is slow and certainly not guaranteed, especially in conservative states. Finally, employers that operate in multiple states are likely
to include choice-of-law clauses in their supervisors’ contracts to attempt to avoid state laws that extend wage disclosure rights to supervisors by litigating under state laws that are silent on PSC rules.
The second option for reform modifies only the NLRA. In this
scenario, Congress gives the NLRA bite and extends the specific section 7 right to discuss wages to supervisors. Giving the NLRA power
to levy punitive damages will discourage employers from adopting
PSC rules. Extending the right of wage disclosure to supervisors
through the NLRA accomplishes the goal of blanket coverage of all
employees expeditiously. This presents a clear advantage over the
first option, which would wait for state action. The legal justification
for imparting the section 7 right of wage disclosure onto supervisors
stems from the original purpose of excluding supervisors in the first
place. The exclusion was motivated by Congress’s desire to free employers to fire foremen as a means of ensuring their loyalty and to
267
prevent supervisor influence within a union.
The reasons for excluding supervisors from the NLRA lack applicability in the context
of PSC rules. Nonetheless, this second option for reform fails because of the same deficiencies inherent in the first proposal. Namely,

“be a very tough sell with any Congress.” William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice
Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of LaborManagement Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 310 (2008). Concerns of fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion frequently lead to disputes regarding
the legitimacy of authorization cards. Id. at 309–10. Additionally, the proposed system will allow for unions to more easily organize workplaces, which is sure to inspire
automatic opposition from anti-union members of Congress. Id. at 310−11. Hostility
toward unions among segments of Congress coupled with concerns surrounding potential for peer pressure signal that the EFCA’s passage is far from certain. Id.
265
Gely & Bierman, supra note 103, at 149.
266
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
267
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 694–95 (1980).
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similar NLRA reform has failed in the past, and Congress is unlikely
to alter the NLRA’s fundamental remedial nature.
The final and most promising option for reform calls for congressional legislation to accomplish the following: make PSC rules illegal per se, provide civil penalties for violations, allow plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages, establish notice requirements in all
workplaces, and extend protection to supervisors and non-supervisory
employees alike. Congress can utilize the third exception to the
Garmon preemption doctrine to carve out jurisdiction of wage disclo268
sure activity to state and federal courts.
Unlike the NLRB, the
NLRA’s reparative philosophy will not restrict state and federal
courts’ power to craft effective remedies. Additionally, vesting the
right to sue in attorneys general and employees will avoid problems
269
that result from the NLRB’s reactive character. If Congress implements this option, all goals of reform are achieved. The legislation
will motivate employers to abandon PSC rules, extend the right to
engage in wage discussion to supervisory employees, and provide notice to employees. This option is particularly appealing because
reform is accomplished uniformly on a national basis rather than
piecemeal by states. Federal legislation should also include provisions reassuring employers that the new law will not affect confidentiality policies governing employees who handle salary information.
In July 2006, Vermont Senator James Jeffords introduced the
270
Wage Awareness Protection Act.
This bill attempted to make PSC
271
rules illegal per se. It failed to pass the Senate, which suggests that a
similar bill may suffer the same fate; however, Ledbetter and the resulting attention directed toward wage discrimination should raise
awareness of PSC rules’ potential danger and inspire legislators to reconsider the importance of protecting the right to discuss pay. The
following model represents a summary of legislation that could effectively curtail the ongoing promulgation of PSC rules:
268

See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 197 (1978). Although the NLRB may unilaterally relinquish its jurisdiction
over certain subjects to state and federal courts pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c), this is
not a suitable opportunity for such action because § 164(c)(1) requires that the effect of the labor activity be insubstantial. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2006). This is not
the case with wage discussion because “dissatisfaction due to low wages is the grist on
which concerted activity feeds.” Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir.
1976).
269
See supra notes 167−169 and accompanying text.
270
S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000).
271
Id. § 2(a)(4)(B).
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(A) Prohibited Acts. No employer may do any of the following:
(i) Promulgate or enforce a written or oral employment policy
that forbids its employees from inquiring about, discussing, or
disclosing their own wages or the wages of other employees; or
(ii) Formally discipline, discharge, or discriminate against em
ployees for inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing their own
wages or the wages of other employees.
(B) Penalties and Enforcement.
(i) Whenever the attorney general has cause to believe that an
employer is engaged in a practice declared by this statute to be
unlawful, the attorney general may bring a civil action in the ap
propriate district court of the United States. District courts are
authorized to do any of the following:
(1) issue injunctions to restrain and prevent violations of
this statute; or
(2) impose civil penalties of not more than $10,000 for each
violation.
(ii) Any employee aggrieved by a violation of this statute may
bring an action in a district court of the United States seeking
compensatory and punitive damages or equitable relief, include
ing restitution of wages or benefits, restraint of prohibited acts,
reinstatement, reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and other ap
propriate relief.
(C) Posting of Notices; Penalties.
(i) Every employer shall keep posted in conspicuous locations
on its premises a notice setting forth a summary of this statute
and information pertinent to filing a complaint.
(ii) A violation of this subsection is punishable by a fine of no
272
more than $1,000 for each separate offense.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ledbetter used an overly rigid interpretation of Title VII to establish a dangerous precedent that would have prohibited many employees from advancing legitimate claims of pay discrimination. The
LLFPA marked an important step in the fight against pay discrimination by overturning the central holding of Ledbetter, but it failed to ac272
State statutes, federal statutes, and unenacted federal legislation informed the
drafting of the model statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
2458 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through 2009
Sess.); S. 2966.
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cord adequate protection to employees in workplaces that promulgate PSC rules. Such employees remain vulnerable to Title VII’s relatively short statutory charging period and its two-year limit on back
pay. Rather than passing an amendment to Title VII, which could
frustrate public policy favoring prompt processing of discrimination
claims, future legislation should aim to solve the problem at its
source⎯unlawful PSC rules.
Lawmakers and judges on both the federal and state levels have
recognized the importance of pay openness, but current legislation
designed to prevent PSC rules is inherently flawed and ineffective.
Congress must pass reform that carves out from the NLRB jurisdiction over wage discussion and prevents the promulgation of PSC rules
by instituting meaningful incentives for employers to comply with the
law. Until this happens, the LLFPA cannot operate to its full potential, and Title VII will continue to provide many American workers
with inadequate protection against pay discrimination.

